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1961 Project Moondust FOIA Documents

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON
25, D.C.

REPLY TO ATTN OF: APCIN-1E-0/Colonel Betz

SUBJECT: (U) AFCIN Intelligence Team Personnel 3 NOV 1961

TO: APCIN-1E This draft proposal was not APCIN-1 approved and was not for –

N.M. Rosner PROBLEM: NORMAN M. ROSNER Lt. Colonel, USAF

1. (U) To provide qualified personnel for APCIR intelligence teams.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

2.

c. In addition to their staff duty assignments, intelligence team personnel
have peacetime duty functions in support of such Air Force projects as Moondust,
Bluefly, and UFO, and other AFCIN directed quick reaction projects which require
intelligence team operational capabilities (see Definitions).

d. Normal personnel attrition, through PCS, discharge, retirement, etc., has
reduced the number of intelligence team qualified personnel below a minimum
requirement, and programmed personnel losses within the next ten months will
halve the current manning.

e. Personnel actions within the authority of AFFMP, AFCIN and AFCIN-1E can be
taken to reverse the trend toward diminishment of the intelligence team
capability.

4. Criteria

a. Intelligence team personnel can perfomr effectively only with an adequate
background of training and experience. Inadequately qualified personnel in such
assignment would be a liability rather than an asset to successful
accomplishment of the mission.

5. Definitions.

a. Linguist: Personnel who can develop intelligence information through
interrogation and translation from Russion and/or Bloc country languages to
English.

b. Tech Man: Personnel qualified to develop intelligence infor mation through
field examination and analysis of foreign material, with emphasis on the
Markings Program and technical photography.

c. Ops Man: Intelligence team chief. Qualified to direct intel ligence teams
in gaining access to target, in exploitation of enemy personnel and material,
and in use of field communications equipment for rapid reporting of intelligence
information.

d. Airborne Personnel: Military trained and rated parachutists.

e. Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO): Headquarters USAF has established a
program for investigation of reliably reported unidenti fied flying objects
within the United States. AFR 200-2 delineates 1127th collection
responsibilities.

f. Blue Fly: Operation Blue Fly has been established to facilitate
expeditious delivery to FTD of Moon Dust or other items of great tech nical
intelligence interest. AFCIN SOP for Blue Fly operations, February 1960,
provides for 1127th participation.

g. Moon Dust: As a specialized aspect of its over-all material exploitation
program, Headquarters USAF has established Project Moon Dust to locate, recover
and deliver descended foreign space vehicles.

ICGL #4, 25 April 1961, delineates collection responsibilities.

DISCUSSION:

6.

a. Headquarters USAF (AFCIN) maintains intelligence teams as a function of
AFCIN-1E (1127th USAF Field Activities Group). Personnel comprising such teams
have normal AFCIN-1E staff duties, and their maintenance of qualification for
intelligence team employment is in addition to their normal staff duties. For
example, the Chief of AFCIN-1E-OD, the Domestic Operations Section, additionally
participates in approximately 18 hours of training per month for intelligence
team employment. Such training includes physical training, classroom combat
intelligence training, airborne operations, field problems, etc

b. Intelligence teams are comprised of three men each, to include a linguist,
a tech man, and an ops man. All are airborne qualified.

Cross-training is provided each team member in the skills of the other team
members to assure a team functional capability despite casualties which may be
incurred in employment.

c. Peacetime employment of AFCIN intelligence team capability is provided for
in UFO investigation (AFR 200-2) and in support of Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)
Foreign Technology Division (FTD) Projects Moon Dust and Blue Fly. These three
peacetime projects all involve a potential for employment of qualified field
intelligence personnel on a quick reaction basis to recover or perform field
exploitation of unidentified flying objects, or known Soviet/Bloc aerospace
vehicles, weapons systems, and/or residual componants of such equipment. The
intelligence team capability to gain rapid access, regardless of location, to
recover or perform field exploitation, to communicate and provide intelligence
reports is the only such collection capability available to AFCIN, and is
vitally necessary in view of current intelli gence gaps concerning Soviet/Bloc
technological capabilites.

d. Wartime employment of AFCIN intelligence team capability is currently
primarily geared to the CONAD/NORAD air defense mission (Atch I).

The intelligence team concept was originally developed within the Air Defense
Command (ADC). The ADC Director of Intelligence was charged in 1953 with
organizing the 4602d Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS), with a wartime
mission of exploiting downed enemy “people, paper, and hardware” for
intelligence information that would contribute to the air defense of the
continental US, and ADC was allocated manpower for this function (ADC Regulation
24-4, 3 Jan 53, Organization and Mission of the 4602d Air Intelligence Service
Squadron).

e. As an economy move, the 201 spaces of the 4602d AISS were trans ferred to
AFCIN in July 1957 (Hq Comd General Order 46, dtd 8 Jul 57), to provide manning
for peacetime AFCIN functions, but with the contin gency that AFCIN would
continue to maintain a capability to support CONAD/NORAD in the wartime people,
paper, and hardware mission (Atchs 2 and 3). From the 194 spaces that AFCIN
allocated to the 1006th AISS, activated by Hq Comd General Order #49, 2 Jul 57,
this capability was provided for (Dept of AF ltr, dtd 16 Jul 59, subj: Mission
of the 1006th AISS), and the capability has been maintained to the present time,
through the redesignation of the 1006th to the 1127th USAF Field Activities
Group (AFCIN Policy Ltr 205-13, 13 April 1960).

f. The maintenance of the intelligence team capability over the four year
period since inactivation of the 4602d AISS has been possible largely because
members of the original highly select and trained 4602d personnel remained with
the organization during its subsequent designa

In addition, a minimum number of new personnel assigned to the organization
and fortuitously possessing basic requisite skills, were further trained and
integrated into the intelli gence team program as additional duty.

g. Manning of the intelligence teams from these sources has now reached the
point of diminishing returns. Only 21 qualified intelligence team personnel are
now assigned, and of these approximately half are scheduled for PCS departure
from the organization during the next 12 months. There is no forecast input of
previously qualified personnel.

There are currently five basically qualified volunteers for further training
and assignment to intelligence team additional duty.

h. In an effort to augment the diminishing capability, USAF personnel
assigned to organizations other than the 1127th within the Washington area who
have airborne/intelligence team qualification, and/or who are former members of
this organization’s intelligence teams, and who have been approved by their
organization of assignment and Hq USAF (AFCIN) for wartime assignment to the
1127th, have been issued appro priate orders, and participate in the peacetime
training program for wartime employment. Two such personnel are attached, with
no known available additional personnel.

i. The most serious immediate and forecast intelligence team shortage is in
Linguists. There are now only five Russion Linguists assigned or attached, and
of these only two are of native fluency, with the other three of language school
capability. Four of the five, including the two of native fluency, are forecast
for PCS by November 1962. Only one gain, fortunately of native fluency, is
scheduled for airborne training for intelligence team qualification and
assignment.

Two additional Russian Linguists are forecast for assignment to the 1127th,
but neither are yet intelligence team qualified or are known to be volunteers
for intelligence team assignment. All intelligence team personnel are
volunteers.

j.  Eight personnel in these categories are forecast for PCS loss within
the next twelve months, with an input forecast of five personnel, four of whom
are presently assigned, basically qualified volunteers for airborne training,
and one of whom is a forecast gain to the 1127th.

k. A sizeable number of qualified Linguists are presently assigned to ZI
bases. Many of the Linguists are either airborne rated and/ or have had
intelligence team assignments to this organization in its present or former
designations. Reassignment of these individuals to AFCIN-1E upon completion of
their present tours is a logical method by

CONCLUSION:

7. There is a valid current and continuing need for the AFCIN intelligence
team capability for peacetime and wartime employment.

Actions necessary to maintain the capability in “cadre” strength
should be immediately implemented, and actions to expand the capability should
be implemented on a sound basis of personnel acquisition, training, equipping,
and employment.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

8.

a. Basically qualified personnel currently assigned to AFCIN-1E who volunteer
for further training, to include airborne training, and assignment to
intelligence teams, should be given such training and assignment as additional
duty to normal staff duty employment. Attach- ” ment 4 is a current request
for airborne training quotas for five qualified volunteers.

b. AFCIN-1E should prepare, and submit through appropriate channels,
individual justifications for the following:

(l) Authorized overage assignment on a selective basis of an initial ten
intelligence team qualified Linguists returning to the ZI from overseas
assignment, with a later additional supplement in the event of AFCIN authorized
expansion of cadre strength of the intelligence team capability.

(2) Detention beyond normal duty tours of qualified intelligence team
personnel now assigned to the 1127th until similarly qualified replacements are
forecast or assigned.

(3) Request for establishment of an AFPMP and AFCIN-P practice to identify to
AFCIN-1E previously qualified intelligence team personnel forecast for return to
the ZI from overseas assignments. Latitude should be requested by AFCIN-1E in
assignment of such personnel against actual or forecast vacancies in AFSC and
grade spaces in variance with those possessed by the returnees if it is
established that returnees have non AFSC skills which can be effectively
utilized in the vacant spaces.

(4) Ninety-day TDY of AFCIN intelligence team to South Viet Nam for
employment in Viet Nam/Laos against USAF intelligence requirements.

Experience gained in establishing logistical support and operational
employment will be invaluable in developing further plans for intelligence team
utilization. The team should be attached to the Air Attache, Viet Nam, and under
his operational control for the period of TYD.

4 Atch

1. Excerpt, 1127 COP 1-60, re NORAD Supper

2. Cy 1tr, Gen Taylor, 23 Jan 57

3. Cy 1tr, Gen Lewis, 4 Mar 57